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ABSTRACT: What authority should experts have? The “authority” of “speaking with authority” is not the 
“authority of “acting with authority.” In decisions shared with experts, we need clearer responsibilities and lines 
of authority for the non-experts as well as for the experts. A better balance between the experts’ authority and our 
own, drawing on a wider variety of experts, promises much better-justified decisions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our paradigm of the expert is the expert who is also an authority: the person whose knowledge 
can and should be the decisive factor in deliberations. What the expert advises is what should 
be done. The classic examples are the doctor whose medical advice should determine the 
correct treatment for what ails you, the lawyer whose legal advice will determine whether you 
have a case worth taking to trial, and the scientist whose knowledge of ecosystems will 
determine whether your community is drawing unsustainable amounts of water from the 
aquifer.  
 However, all of these classic examples also exhibit the problematic lack of authority 
that handicaps the expert, preventing his or her knowledge from being decisive. The decision is 
often not in the expert’s hands. The patient can refuse treatment. The client, given deep enough 
pockets, can go ahead and sue anyway. The water-hogs might be stopped, but more likely by 
legislation than by scientific testimony alone. The expert has authority in the sense of 
“speaking with authority,” but not in the sense of “signing authority.” 
 When we worry about whether we can assess an expert’s credibility accurately 
enough to make it safe to rely on the experts’ advice or testimony, the expert has an equal and 
opposite worry: when can he or she rightly insist on having at least a voice in the final 
decision, or perhaps even cast the deciding vote? 
2. THE GAP BETWEEN EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY 
Missing in most discussions of the wise use of experts is any explicit consideration of power. 
Power, in its simplest form, is the ability to get things done. All of us have at least some power, 
at least at the level of being able to make some decisions and carry out our intended actions. 
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“Positional power” (Fisher 1983, November/December)1 is the added power of formal 
authority: the right to vote, the right to command, the right to make a binding decision: 
“signing authority.” We typically do, and should, defer to legitimate authorities: those whose 
positions give them formal authority to make decisions which bind us. But in both our personal 
decisions, and in public policy decisions, it is not always clear who is the “legitimate 
authority.” 
 For a personal medical decision such as whether to go ahead with surgery, am I the 
“legitimate authority” since only my signature on the consent form will count? For a public 
policy issue such as whether to build oil pipelines or permit tanker traffic down the British 
Columbia coast, how is authority shared? Partial or complete authority—in the sense of 
entitlement to make binding decisions—could be in the hands of voters, or the politicians they 
have already voted into public office. It could also be neither of those groups, since none of us 
have the same level of understanding of the consequences of our decisions as 
environmentalists, and, in British Columbia, the voters at large do not have a right to speak for 
the many aboriginal First Nations, who never signed any binding treaties with the Canadian 
Crown, and whose ancestral lands such as the World Heritage site, Haida Gwaii, are in the path 
of tanker traffic. 
 This range of potential authorities reveals the wide spectrum from the “authority” of 
experts to the “authority” of positional power and signing authority. The environmentalists 
bring scientific expertise: objective, predictive power about the likely risks of tanker traffic.2 
The aboriginal people bring lived experience, many generations of knowledge of how the land 
and sea behave. They and non-natives bring value systems, expertise in the form of setting 
priorities such as improving the economy, or guaranteeing sustainability. The politicians bring 
expertise in decision making, the back-room negotiations between interest groups that allow 
legislation to be crafted with the necessary compromises to get a majority vote. Theirs is the 
most clearly formal positional power, the power to set public policy, but even they are subject 
to the power of the courts to declare the legislation unconstitutional and to the power of the 
electorate to vote out any politician making too many unpopular decisions. 
 How do we place “expertise” in general, and “scientific expertise” in particular, into 
this power continuum? However much we worry in logic or rhetoric about the difficulties of 
weighing the relative merits of expert claims, we don’t worry as often as we ought to about 
when we should defer to the experts and when they should defer to us. We drift along in a half-
way state, confident that whoever isn’t feeling sufficiently heard will speak up at some point, 
and at that point we can resolve whose knowledge is most accurate and should be given the 
greatest weight. By blurring together the “authority” of “speaking with authority” and the 
                                                
1  Original versions of the classic Harvard “win-win” model of negotiating assumed participants had equal 
power. In response to criticisms that this is unrealistic, Fisher identified six different types of power and 
suggested how each type of power plays a role in balancing the power of each negotiator.  
2  This is not a single type of expertise. As noted in Chantelle Marlor’s (2009) Ph. D thesis, there are distinct 
differences between the ways research biologists and Department of Fisheries and Oceans biologists construct 
their knowledge of the abundance of clams. Both contrast sharply with the aboriginal clam diggers’ own ways 
of knowing the abundance of clams, which is based on direct experience of their traditional patches of beach. 
One clam digger was incredulous that a scientist in Ottawa, thousands of miles away, could ever know 
anything at all about clams when the scientists only processed data collected by others and never saw or felt 
the beach and the clams himself. 
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“authority” of “acting with authority,” we obscure the crucial variations along that spectrum 
from knowledge to power.  
 There is an ideal world in which knowledge and power are co-extensive. It’s an 
Enlightenment world in which all people are formally equal, and only knowledge and reason 
can be used to tip the balance to one decision rather than another. In such a world, the expert, 
who is presumed not only to have knowledge but to reason correctly with that extra 
knowledge, would indeed be the authority whose word should direct the decisions of others. To 
the extent that this ideal is our paradigm, we assume that the expert not only can but probably 
should explain his or her judgment and its rationale well enough for the non-expert to have a 
crash course in the subject and feel able to understand. 
 In our less-than-ideal world, the expert’s access to power is not as straightforward, 
either because he or she doesn’t reason well enough, or because other people do not understand 
the information or the reasoning well enough to trust the expert’s judgment, or because equally 
qualified experts disagree. If the defence calls 8 medical witnesses in a personal-injury case 
and the prosecution calls 9, none of whom can be readily understood by the jury, who should 
prevail? The standard questions then emerge: for example, how can we assess credibility in the 
absence of understanding? How can we protect ourselves from unfair liability in the event we 
rely on an expert who is later found to be at fault?3 
 We do have criteria for assessing the credibility of experts who speak at a level we 
cannot personally understand (Goodwin, 2011). The research in this area gives us a much 
better chance of being able to exercise our own authority with sufficient responsibility. We can 
at least follow the guidelines to be sure that we have chosen the most credible expert in the 
most relevant field, and even if we do not fully understand the expert’s reasoning, we can 
weigh the expert’s recommendation more heavily than our own preferences in reaching a 
decision.  
 However, the credibility of expert testimony or advice is a secondary question. The 
primary question remains the question of power. When should “authority” be located in the 
expert? Not all experts function in the same capacity, and so not all experts will have equal 
authority in relation to one another, or more authority than non-experts.  
 There are a considerable range of expert functions. The advisor/advisee relationship is 
only one. Others include judge, arbitrator, counsellor, coach, team leader, specialist employee, 
and provider of services for pay. What varies across the functions is not only the knowledge 
and the decision-making authority, but also the expectations of non-experts’ entitlement to hear 
and understand the expert’s judgment.  
 In some cases, the expert must make his or her knowledge and reasoning transparent 
to the non-expert. These would be the cases in which we would also be able to expect the non-
expert to understand and be able to make wise use of the expert’s judgment. In other cases, it is 
the expert’s competence in performance that is really at issue, and only the final result or the 
person’s track record need be evaluated before choosing to pay for expert services. The 
                                                
3  The studies revealing problems with expert decision-making are numerous. Experts are prone to all of the 
reasoning errors everyone else makes, even in their area of expertise. A particularly nice example is the study 
which showed that psychiatrists were less accurate than their clerical staff in making diagnoses. Philip Tetlock 
(2011), Expert political judgment: How good is it? How can we know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP) reviews 
many of the experiments which showed that expert judgment is notoriously imprecise and inaccurate, 
especially when used to predict future events and trends. An equally fascinating and discouraging book is 
Carol Tavris and Elliot Arneson’s (2008) Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why We Justify Foolish 
Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (USA: Mariner Books). 
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contrast is shown, for example, by the difference between the expertise of a judge and the 
expertise of a counsellor. A judge or arbitrator has to make his or her reasons for decision clear 
to the parties. A counsellor does not: as long as the client begins to function in a more 
successful way, it may not matter what theoretical background the counsellor has brought to 
the therapy sessions. Similarly, a coach has to be able to share his or her performance 
knowledge explicitly enough that the athlete in training may surpass the expert, while an elite 
athlete is under no such obligation to share the secrets of top performance with competitors. A 
computer security expert employed to keep company data safe and a locksmith who is called in 
to change the locks are both free to keep their specialist knowledge to themselves—that is 
precisely what is earning them the fee for their services. 
 The teacher, professor, or coach whose expertise must be shared with the 
student/client often operates in a structure in which authority is gradually transferred to the 
student or client. The whole point of these people’s expertise is precisely that they will be able 
to pass on the expertise, to ensure that the people they teach will understand all the key issues 
and reasoning, and will be able to perform up to the expected standard. As their performance 
hits the target levels, they reach the point where their own judgment becomes good enough for 
them to assume the responsibility for making their own decisions. They may in time even 
become experts in their own right, and their relationship with their former mentors may 
become equal and collegial rather than deferential. 
 In contrast, the chef or locksmith or electrician, whose livelihood depends precisely 
on not sharing expertise except as a paid-for finished product or service, operates in a structure 
in which the authority is always divided. The expert always retains authority over exactly how 
to provide the service, because in that respect his or her expertise is the relevant factor in 
ensuring not only quality of service but continued demand for the service. You won’t come 
back to the restaurant if you can duplicate the recipe at home. The locksmith who shows how 
it’s done will be out of business. The electrician dare not teach you unless there’s some 
assurance that you will have to do your wiring safely to code. However, you as the customer or 
client always retain the authority to refuse the service if it does not meet your needs: the 
service cannot be imposed on you. It is this freedom to refuse that is often the authority we 
cling to when faced with decisions from authorities which are not to our liking. 
 Consequently, while it can be crucial to weigh the credibility of an expert, we are 
often not weighing only their knowledge. I can choose the “best chef” or “best locksmith” the 
same way I can choose the “best coach,” by reputation and performance. What I don’t know 
from these checks is when I should simply put myself in their hands, to get a good meal, get 
back into my house, or get a better athletic performance, or whether I should insist that I 
continue to have a say in the decisions they make. The “freedom to refuse” is a very limited 
amount of control over the decision making. It leaves me in or out: often a false dilemma. 
Often we want more authority that that, but less than a fully shared decision. We want the type 
of authority used in negotiation: the freedom to question the terms of the deal. Can I insist the 
chef leave out the salt, or the locksmith open only the side door instead of the one in full view 
of the street, or make the coach negotiate with me on what the training regimen will be? I 
cannot completely control the outcome of the negotiation. They have a responsibility to their 
own role and expertise to exercise at least some authority over how their expertise may be 
used. At the same time, I can expect at least the authority to expect an answer as to why my 
request cannot be granted. Will there be further discussion? Must we reach a consensus on 
whether a deal is or is not possible? 
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 It will not always be obvious how much authority the expert and non-expert should 
each have. Our assessment of expertise should include not just when to value expert advice, 
but when our decision-making power as non-experts should be reduced accordingly. When can 
the expert make it “her way or the highway,” and when can the non-expert cheerfully and 
justifiably ignore the expert? We have a number of practice-based guidelines, but no solid 
principles for power sharing. This is due in part to what seems to be an ongoing shift away 
from seeing experts as “authorities” who should be exercising decision-making power. 
 The shift might be due at least in part to the fact that it is scientific expertise—whether 
medical, environmental, or technological—which for most of the twentieth century was the 
respected form of expertise. Scientific expertise offers a specific and somewhat unusual place 
in the spectrum of expertise. Scientific expertise is supposed to be more objective than many 
other kinds of expertise. An astronomer assessing the risk of an asteroid hitting the earth is not 
expected to take a stance on whether the asteroid strike is or is not desirable. The expert chef 
assessing the taste of a new dish is expected to have a personal goal at stake: will this dish 
draw in more customers? The nutritionist assessing the nutritional value of this dish, however, 
might also be an advocate for healthier eating, and therefore be neither as purely objective as 
the scientist nor as clearly profit-driven as the chef.  
 Can the nutritionist have enough power to enforce a good dietary regime on you? In a 
hospital or care home, a nutritionist certainly can: if you have any menu choice at all, it will be 
between items the hospital dietician has decided are good for you. But are those choices 
optimal? The dietician may not have enough authority to compel the hospital to offer the best 
possible choices, if those choices are not as economical as some less nutritious but still healthy 
choices. The dietician has even less authority to help set public policy on vending machines in 
public schools or on menu choices in local restaurants. Are we eating ourselves into diabetes 
and heart attacks? Nutritional science can only make its message clear enough to be understood 
by the public; it cannot enforce compliance with a better diet. Our question about the authority 
of the expert is not just about the quality of the nutritional advice, but about the proper level of 
authority of the expert: the amount of power a dietician should have to enforce our dietary 
choices. 
  When we use scientists as the paradigm of experts, it seems strange that we would 
ignore their advice. Yes, as citizens we have the right to vote instead of letting them decide for 
us—but surely we would expect that at least a majority of us would be reasonable enough to 
listen to and vote based on their advice. But the paradox is already built into why we valued 
their expertise in the first place: they are, after all, objective in their advice, not pushing us in 
any direction the facts should not take us. It is not clear that “the facts” and the scientists’ 
understanding of their significance, even assuming they reason correctly from their knowledge, 
should be enough to guide our decision: we have always had at least that authority of “freedom 
to choose,” freedom to reject any advice. 
 There are two issues in balancing power. The first is that there is no straightforward 
way to balance the power between experts in different fields—to determine the relative 
“signing authority” of experts with equal “speaking authority” in their respective fields. The 
other is that the guidelines in place for making decisions may give signing authority to parties 
who hire the experts, and can contractually constrain the experts’ authority. 
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 Consider, for example, a patient-care team in a hospital where a team decision is 
required before surgery can be scheduled.4 The team is chosen precisely in order to bring to 
bear a range of relevant expertise covering different factors in the case: for example, a decision 
on a child’s surgery might include a paediatric surgeon, a child-welfare specialist, a nurse, and 
a physiotherapist. In a difficult case, where the surgery involves the brain or vital organs, the 
choice might be between surgery and palliative care (if the surgery has insufficient chance of 
success). In such circumstances, the surgeon may believe that understanding whether surgical 
intervention could help is the most crucial expertise in deciding whether to go ahead with the 
surgery. The nurse might argue that an understanding of how palliative care maximizes quality 
of life is the most crucial. The child welfare specialist might argue that it is crucial to 
understand whether the family’s circumstances and values are more compatible with taking the 
risk of surgery or facing the finality of palliative care. Each could actively try to sway other 
members of the team and each could be correspondingly frustrated if they cannot persuade the 
others.  
 Understandable as their frustration might be, the patient-care team illustrates why 
decisions involving more than a single type of expertise often have no straightforward lines of 
authority. Nurses have expertise in patient care and education that is a different type of 
expertise from a surgeon’s knowledge of the patient’s medical problem. Child-welfare 
advocates understand the pressures on the family inside and outside the hospital in ways 
neither the nurse nor surgeon does. Ideally, they will share their expertise to reach consensus,5 
but if they don’t, then what? A majority vote is a possibility, but the only reason to let “signing 
authority” lie with the majority is the assumption that the majority vote represents a decision 
that has more factors in its favour than any of the minority alternatives.  
 Typically, when an expert team cannot reach a decision, there is an authority structure 
that must step in: for a patient-care team, for example, it would likely be the hospital ethics 
board, which has principles it will apply as a matter of policy where the experts disagree. The 
ethics board is the de facto authority, but it stands in much the same relation to the experts and 
to the patients’ families as the politicians do to their scientific advisors and to voters at large. It 
has the right to design a policy, and the considerations it is guided by might be completely 
unrelated to the medical expertise of the experts or the preferences of the patients’ families. For 
example, it usually considers the legal liability for failing at “too risky” a surgery, and it 
probably also has an ethics policy like those of many large organizations which is explicitly 
utilitarian, to maximize results on a limited budget, and this ethical code may not at all accord 
with the actual beliefs and values of patients’ families.  
 The patient-care team illustrates, therefore, not only the difficulty of spreading 
authority across multiple experts, but also the problem that their authority in total is still 
limited by the scope of their employment. They have the authority to use their expertise to its 
fullest in making a case for what is in their opinion the best decision. For some decisions, they 
will have signing authority; for others, they have at most one vote in a group decision; for still 
others, they have no vote at all. They are not employed to set the hospital’s policies, and can at 
                                                
4  The example is presented generically but the procedure is taken from a real example, examined in detail in a 
student research interview (personal communication, December 2011). All identifying details, including the 
interviewer’s name, have been omitted to preserve confidentiality. 
5  For example, the city of Abbotsford formed decision-making teams with police, social workers and a variety 
of other community services, to consult with each other on plans of action for the community, especially in its 
downtown core which had an exceptionally high crime rate.  
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most use their expertise to lobby the authorities above them to set policies they recommend. Is 
this the right scope of authority just because their employment contract is structured to limit 
their responsibilities to the cases they handle? I would consider this an open question. Medical 
decisions require such a complex blend of ethical and physiological considerations, it is by no 
means obvious that the top-level decision making on hospital policy is done by people with a 
better claim to expertise or wiser use of power. 
 Limited authority outside the scope of employment (and even within it) is not true of 
all occupations, and therefore not of all experts. For some, the authority that comes with their 
expertise and employment is “signing authority.” For example, a fire chief or police officer 
will not take time to consult your wishes in ordering you out of a dangerous situation. As a 
matter of public policy, your safety has been determined to outrank your right to understand. 
Therefore these experts have been given the formal authority to make you obey first and 
question later, regardless of whether you personally would rank your safety as paramount. And 
they do have the knowledge base to make a better decision than you can on what is safe. You 
may have the right to refuse an evacuation order—Harry Truman on Mt. St. Helens being one 
of the best-known examples—but this is an example of rejecting expert advice, and resisting 
authority, not an example of the authorities having only expert knowledge with which to sway 
the non-expert’s decision. 
 As with the patient’s family in a paediatric surgery case, evacuees are not consulted 
about the policies with which they will be expected to comply. The homeowners might resist 
evacuation but must do so knowing no aid of any kind will be in place if they stay. The parents 
might refuse surgery if it is offered—but if surgery is not offered, typically they cannot compel 
it to happen. The most they can do is seek another surgeon, another team, or another hospital. 
In many cases, public policy has been decided far in advance of members of the public having 
any definite say in that decision. Neither they nor the most “objective” experts have any 
guarantee of having enough authority to sway a decision.  
 This shifts the nature of our quest. Finding the right signing authority may not be a 
matter of choosing between types of relevant expertise or between pre-existing rights to choose 
or to refuse. It may, instead, be a matter of attending to the process of choosing. If decision-
making authority is to be shared, we presumably want to avoid closed-mindedness to one 
another’s expertise just as much as we want to avoid being gullible and falling prey to an 
“investment guru” whose expertise is less than our own.  
 We like the notion of being well-informed but independent in our judgment, to the 
extent that when it comes to policy decisions, we are sceptical of policy set at the hospital 
administration level, and downright distrustful of policy set at the government level. We 
particularly want to avoid being controlled by politicians whose capacity to persuade us relies 
on the very deep pockets of the special interest groups whose motives we suspect. 
 This puts us in the position where the central question of authority arises in policy 
debates. Where should the authority be located? Unlike private enterprise, public organizations 
and government cannot claim that their senior executives are by definition the right authorities 
to make the decisions. In theory, policy debate is democratic and we all have influence as 
voters, but in practice the decisions are made after the politicians are elected and often in spite 
of what they heard in any public forum or from any scientific briefing paper. Unlike scientists, 
politicians do not have a reputation as objective fact-finders and decision-makers. However, 
politicians are no less “expert” in their own way. They have a form of expertise that is typically 
crucial to the development of policies: they know how to get things done. They have an 
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expertise in bringing together people with disparate interests and skilfully negotiating 
sufficient common ground to develop legislation that will receive a majority vote. 
 This expertise is significant in the decision-making process, not just in the content of 
the decision. One of the frustrations of an objective expert—be she a scientist or a 
philosopher—is that people often “just won’t listen” to the incontrovertible facts and the 
objective argument that ought, the expert believes, to be absolutely crucial in the formation of 
policy. Rejecting advice is common in corporate and political circles, and resisting authority is 
common among both the oppressed and the free. The shanty-town dweller, ordered to move for 
new development, can stay on until the bulldozer comes and the journalists with it. The 
telecommunications expert can recommend the best current technology to update the office 
phone system, and the boss can simply say, “But that’s not Bell Canada,” and reject the 
proposal.  
 The frustration with seeing good advice ignored often comes because the “objective” 
expert may lack, or even scorn, the politician’s skills in figuring out how to make people listen. 
It’s not uncommon, even, for such people to scorn the necessary negotiating skills—“that’s all 
politics”; “I don’t do politics”; “politics is a dirty business.”  
 This is a matter not only of rhetoric but also of philosophy, because we are often 
dealing with “deep disagreements” (Fogelin, 1985/2005),6 issues on which not only “office 
politics” but public policy must face fundamental differences in belief: about the importance of 
independence versus conformity, about the value of quality of life versus life itself, about the 
economy now versus the environment seven generations from now. 
 At this level of decision making we are in a realm where even expertise in ethics or 
philosophy cannot put forward a single best decision. There is no obvious “authority” on these 
issues—at best we have “signing authorities” whose decision making we may not agree with 
but whose entitlement to decide we can respect.  
 And here again is one of the difficulties of designing a better paradigm for decision-
makers. We may not want to defer automatically to the expert, but nor do we necessarily know 
what it takes to assume responsibility ourselves. One component of decision making that is 
often under-examined is how much responsibility is expected of the non-expert.  
 For example, consider the current state of patient-doctor decision making. My mother 
had undergone several series of cancer treatments before she asked me—not the doctors!— 
“What is cancer, anyway?” There was a time when her behaviour would have been exactly 
what was expected of a patient. “Informed consent” in fact didn’t mean much more than 
ensuring the patient was sufficiently oriented to time and place to count as rational, explaining 
the procedure, and getting the patient to sign on the dotted line where required. Even today, 
when I was given the consent form for “phacoemulsification cataract extraction with 
intraocular lens implant,” I got impatient responses to my queries about details on the form. 
“It’s just the standard form” meant “you’re not supposed to think about it.” But if I don’t read 
the form, and the cancer patient doesn’t ask, “What is cancer?” it’s understandable behaviour, 
but it also seems like unjustifiable reluctance to take proper responsibility for one’s own care.  
 The objective experts do help. That cataract surgery was explained in detail on 
reputable medical sites on the internet, and although there was nothing there related to the 
atypical features in my case, my ophthalmologist and opticians were both able to explain 
exactly why my experience of the surgery and recovery would be different from the norm. By 
                                                
6  This term originates with Robert Fogelin and has become a useful category to cover all disputes which have no 
apparent common ground on which to begin arguing towards agreement.  
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the time I got back to the corneal specialist to confirm the details of the operation, I was well 
enough informed to be confident I could make a sound decision. 
 However, there is one important element that is not enforced on me in exercising my 
authority in this situation. The surgeon is required to exercise due diligence and follow his 
professional code of ethics. I have no such constraint on me. As the medical examples 
illustrate, we are in an evolving paradigm of what “expert authority” is. Where once the expert 
would be making the decision and simply ensuring I consented, I am now more often in the 
position to make the decision myself based on expert advice. Similarly, in the public area, there 
is less authority granted automatically to science, and, in Canada in particular, greater authority 
granted to the aboriginal peoples’ distinctive decision-making methods not only for themselves 
but also in increased consensus-based decision making by all stakeholders, not just by expert 
representatives.  
 As the paradigm shifts to greater consultation and a larger share in the decision 
making, the problem is that the down-grading of the experts’ authority has not been matched 
by any corresponding pressure on me to exercise my authority more wisely when I must make 
a decision or cast a vote. Certainly, I am not prevented from researching diligently and 
consulting multiple sources for a variety of expertise. But I have to tell an embarrassing story 
against myself as an expert in decision-making theory to illustrate the point. It was not until I 
used the very situation of my impending eye surgery as the foundation for a class role-play on 
decision making that I even thought I ought to be asking myself what was important to me in 
this situation: what I wanted, expected, or needed, or how my options appeared from the 
broader perspective of my life and body changing as I age and not just the perspective of what 
would make it possible to grade papers by the end of term. In other words, I had still been 
construing my responsibility in the situation only in terms reading the consent form carefully 
and understanding the reasons to do the surgery now or wait until later—I had been 
considering only my “freedom to refuse.” 
 Until a chance encounter with a “business coach” (anonymous source, personal 
communications, October 2011, February 2012), it would not even have occurred to me to add 
into my decision making anyone except people with some knowledge—expert or simply 
personal—of the surgery itself.  
 “Business coaching” illustrates nicely one of the forms of expertise that is unrelated to 
content-area knowledge.7 It is one of the many forms of decision support. It provides expertise 
in the process of working through the stages of a decision, including where necessary the 
objective assessment of one’s own reasons. What “business coaching” does is to hold people 
who have signing authority, such as CEOs, CFOs, and other senior executives, accountable for 
using wiser decision-making processes. The “coaches” do not offer business expertise of their 
own—they are not expert consultants. They are expert listeners, trained to ask questions which 
will make an executive think through his or her own reasons and expectations in far more 
detail than would normally happen in the rush of a business day. They ensure accountability by 
making the executive set deadlines to move events forward until a decision or plan for action is 
in place. In exercising his or her existing “signing authority,” the executive can now be more 
confident that the authority was exercised responsibly. (The popularity of this form of coaching 
is that its results can be measured in efficiency and productivity, not merely personal 
satisfaction.)  
                                                
7  Sample texts in the area include Coaching in Organizations, Madeleine Homan and Linda Miller (John Wiley 
& Sons, 2008). 
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 The presence of a coach imposes an obligation to recognize and carry out one’s own 
responsibility with respect to how one makes a decision. If I am to play an equal or a decisive 
role in a decision, then I am supposed to exercise my authority responsibly. I had had plenty of 
opportunity in the real eye surgery situation to consult myself. In the role play, I first 
“consulted” my experts and then sat before a “life coach,” who had been given instructions to 
ask me explicitly, “What is important to you?” Even knowing it was coming, the question 
startled me when I had to answer it. Then and only then did I begin to deal with this aspect of 
the decision—fortunately, before binding decisions had been made. When I did think about 
these things, the decision began for the first time to fall into a more manageable perspective. 
What could and should be done depended in part on how I saw the options in relation to my 
values. 
 Recognizing the need to consult my values explicitly instead of assuming they will 
simply come into play permits me to reconsider the nature of my own authority in this medical 
decision. What support do I need, from which experts, to exercise my signing authority wisely? 
It isn’t just the effort of my own thinking; it likely needs the prompts from experts in reasoning 
and decision making. What should the expert surgeon bring, and what should the surgeon do in 
consulting with me, before lifting the scalpel? It isn’t just to know what acuity of vision is 
possible and is normally recommended; it is also to find out whether I actually want maximum 
vision correction or not.  
 I need a much clearer vision of what authority I have and what responsibilities go with 
that. We in general need not only a clearer vision of what responsibilities come with authority 
but a more explicit discussion of how we want authority to be re-assigned in shared decision 
making. 
3. CONCLUSION  
How do we, in public policy decisions, include and properly weigh the advice of the right 
experts in decision making? We are often in the realm where no amount of objective scientific 
expertise—and for that matter, not even objective philosophical expertise in ethics—could 
suffice to guide our actions or policies. Where “truth” is not heard, or is heard but is rejected as 
untruth, we need additional sets of expert skills. These are the skills in decision-making 
processes that are still seldom called on, even though our decision-making paradigms are 
shifting away from reliance on the knowledge expert. 
 One such set of skills is direct expertise in decision-making processes, which for me 
must include both negotiation and dispute resolution as the components frequently required to 
reach a group decision. When we have authority, we need expertise in how to exercise it. And 
this is a form of expertise we cannot outsource completely to content-area experts. 
 We all, expert and non-expert alike, need to seek out and respect the advice of experts 
in decision making, so that our standard for accountability in decisions is not merely the 
common standard given in “Roberts’ Rules” (parliamentary procedure): namely, being 
“sufficiently informed.” We need the higher standard of “sufficiently skilled” decision making. 
This will necessarily include skills in weighing expertise, but also will include skills in 
consultation and co-operation, skills of negotiation, mediation, and peace-making. 
 However, even these skills are at most a partial answer to the question of how we 
allocate authority to experts and non-experts in decisions. We do not have a ready answer to 
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when values must trump economic considerations, or when individual rights trump expert 
judgment even if the resulting decision is terrible.  
 I notice that the current term “Research Ethics” is gradually being replaced by 
“Responsibility in Research” (“Responsible,” 2012). This suggests that we are indeed moving 
towards an “accountability” model of performance—not the compliance with some particular 
code of ethics, but the responsibility of carrying out tasks which assure the reliability and 
integrity of our conduct.  
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